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Abstract The article intends to identify and explain possible geopolitical impli-
cations for the main energy actors of the new developments on global energy
markets and the effect on their foreign policy. To this end, a comparative analysis is
provided, including Russia, United States, China and Qatar case studies. Authors
examine the international activity of these states with special focus on the process of
power shifts between them, their possible alliances and emerging interdependencies.
The findings consist of a set of indications regarding direction and strength of
geopolitical implications for each country (strong, moderate, negative and positive),
foreign policy preferences (enhancement of energy security, maintaining its current
position on the energy market or empowering of the state based on controlling
supplies or transit of energy resources) and foreign policy strategy (expansive or
conservative and offensive or defensive).
Keywords Global energy markets  Energy security  Foreign policy 
Interdependencies
How Independent is the Energy Sector: An Introduction
The world energetic panorama has been associated with decision-making and
political processes for past decades. The main reason for this is that the continuous
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supply of hydrocarbons and energy security of the state have become essential
components of national security, which in the previous years has been limited
mainly to political and military issues. Despite the continuous efforts of progressive
liberalization of energy resources trade in the world, political affairs still play a key
role in global energy markets as evidenced by the recent events in the Arab Spring.
Changes on energy markets can also be a motor of significant political processes
in international relations and drivers of globalization. Distribution of energy
resources in the world brought to power some states (if states had a capacity of
converting this strategic resources into the power1), created new interdependencies,
but also resulted in several conflicts. Therefore, each state should take into account
the importance of such strategic resources in their foreign policy, which should lead
to a further protection of their energy interests in the international arena.
In recent years it is possible to observe the revolutionary changes on global
energy markets, particularly with regard to gas, which, according to International
Energy Agency (IEA 2011), should become the most important energy source. The
revolution of shale gas, diffusion of LNG, retreat from nuclear energy in some
countries after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi, the increasing policy focus on
energy efficiency have potentially far-reaching consequences not only for markets
and energy flows (e.g. further liberalization on gas market) but also for geopolitical
balances. According to authors of this article, even if those changes lead to
progressive liberalization of the energy market, they will not fairly de-politicize the
energy sector. In the future, because of these developments, energy would not be
used directly as a coercive (negative) political tool (e.g. interruption of supplies as
political pressure). However, energy will remain an important factor in international
relations (in particular the access to reserves, new transport routes).
It’s important to emphasize that the existing studies mostly focus on issues
regarding the effects of new developments on energy markets and climate. As a
matter of fact, current literature broadly describes how economic processes can
affect oil and gas market (Hryniewiecki and Boronska 2010), inducing to think that
global energy markets can be considered as a variable that depends on several
factors. Nevertheless, as assumed in this article, energy trends can be analysed as
independent variables that may have geopolitical implications for specific political
actors (dependent variable).
The authors will attempt to answer the question what will be the impact of new
energy trends on states holding a major role on the energy markets, especially in the
gas sector where are observed the most revolutionary changes. The article will
provide a comparative analysis of Russia, United States, China and Qatar,
examining in depth their activities and how the redistribution of power process
among them is developing, looking in particularly at specific issues like empowering
of state, possible allies, interdependencies, foreign policy preferences and
strategies. As the analysis here presented is based on global energy framework
elaborated on several previous reports, authors will only mention major trends to
draw conclusions on the topic. Although the authors are fully aware of other
implications associated with new phenomena provoked by energy trends (such as
1 Nigeria is an example of a state which cannot convert its energy potential into the political power.
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water resources risk associated with energy production, new routes of transport)
these elements will not be taken into exam as they would fairly extend the scope of
the present research.
The article is organized in following way. The first part presents a theory and
criteria for further analyses. The second part is devoted to the analysis of case
studies predeceased by the general description of main trends on global energy
markets. It should lead to forecasts of possible geopolitical implications.
Theoretical Explanation of the International Energetic Arena
In order to elucidate the impact of new energy trends on the selected countries this
paper combines the rational and strategic choice approach (Lake and Powell 1999;
Levy 1997) within the theoretical framework of realism (Carr 2001; Donnelly 2008).
Realism holds that countries are still key actor in shaping the international
environment both as regards bilateral and multilateral relations (Carr 2001; Donnelly
2008). Although nowadays energy companies play an important role in energy
international relations, states are still main actors as more than 70 % of world oil
reserves are owned by controlled states companies (Forbes 2012). In line with the
rational choice approach, it is assumed that states act rationally in the pursuit of their
self-interest, with the primary objective to maintain and ensure their own security and
thus sovereignty and survival (Levy 1997). To this end, they will attempt to
accumulate resources (i.e. energy resources), and create foreign policy to achieve their
energy interests on the international scene. As the energy resources are not unlimited,
countries have to compete (offensive realism) both to satisfy their fundamental need of
energy security, and to expand their political influence (Mearsheimer 2001). This
aggressive approach, however, leads to a situation where increasing one state’s energy
security can lead to an even greater instability as power opponent can build counter-
instruments to protect its own interests. Consequently, energy security becomes a
zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made (Quercia 2012).2 This article
will attempt to identify the potential winners or losers of this game.
Realism also assumes that there are no universal principles to which states can
guide their actions (Levy 1997). On the contrary, in line with the strategic choice
approach (Frieden 1999), every country analyses and anticipates the actions of other
states and adjusts its strategies accordingly. This entails necessity to monitor and
analyse other actors’ expected policies (e.g. country dependent on one gas importer
will be eager to diversify its supplies). This, in turn, involves obtaining information
regarding energy trends and forecasts on possible resources in some countries. In
2 According to Quercia there are three major paradigms of energy policy strategies. First, the import
dependent country strives to ensure itself a stable supplies. This fact mobilizes this state to explore new
routes of import or to be more involved in exploration of its own resources. The oil and gas producer
country, on the other hand, wishes to find a stable demand for its resources and also to expand the export
possibilities (new pipelines, LNG). In the interest of a transit country (third strategy) is to become a hub.
This position is helpful not only for enhancement of energy security but also for empowering of the state
thanks to advantageous geopolitical position towards both consumers, as their security partly depends on
this transit, and the producer countries which has to negotiate prices for transit of its resources to different
states.
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this regard, only assumption about the potential existence of new strategic resources
in oil and gas dependent country might fairly affect its geopolitical position vis a vis
the current supplier.
Accepting the above arguments, several preferences of foreign policy for states
acting on global energy markets can be identified. According to country geopolitical
position and its energy potential, these preferences will be: enhancement of energy
security, maintaining its current position on the energy market or empowering of the
state based on controlling supplies or transit of energy resources. These preferences
lead to certain foreign policy strategies. Some of them can be connected with the
country’s external behaviour. In this regard, we can differentiate between an
expansive and conservative strategy. In the first case, the country will seek new
partners in its non traditional zone or present an aggressive approach on
international arena to achieve its preferences, e.g. energy security or growing
political power. In the second case, the country is less interested in expanding its
international presence for the purpose of energy needs. It will rather consider
decreasing its involvement in certain regions to consolidate its current position. On
the other hand, the authors will distinguish an offensive and defensive strategy. It
will depend on the openness and readiness of state for developments on the energy
market. The offensive strategy will characterize states who are the leaders and the
launchers of major trends on the energy markets like shale gas, LNG or who are
highly interested in those developments. These states will be generally supporting
these trends and technological solutions on international arena. On the other hand,
the defensive strategy will concern countries using different pressure mechanisms to
slow down the new developments to protect its current interests.
New Developments on Global Energy Markets
According to current literature, several international institutions and energy
companies reports new developments are occurring on energy markets (Statoil
2012; ExxonMobil 2012; WEO 2012). All of them assume that in recent years
revolutionary changes on global energy markets raised with the establishment of a
new world energetic panorama characterized by moves in global energy demand
from the triangle US-Japan-EU to emerging Asia (especially China and India).
The International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2012 (WEO 2012),
chosen as a point of reference for this analysis, indicates three pillars of movement
of the current global energy system: revival of production of oil and gas in some
states, nuclear retreat in others, signs of growing political attention in the field of
energy efficiency. For the purpose of this article the authors focus mostly on the first
pillar indicating liberalization of the oil and gas market (thanks to revival of
production and diffusion of LNG technology) as their first independent variable.
The other two pillars will be less explored as they are less connected with the core
analysis; this is to say geopolitical implications.3 However, both pillars will be taken
3 The energy efficiency regards mostly internal policy. ‘‘Nuclear diplomacy’’, on the other hand, was a
domain and the priority of foreign policy of only one state—France.
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into account in analysing the impact of the second independent variable—a shifting
global energy demand which can have far-reaching consequences not only for
energy markets but also for a map of geopolitical interests.
Revival of production of oil and gas associated with the revolution in unconven-
tional resources, particularly shale gas and shale oil, results not only in a strong
decrease of the price of these resources. It also changes the current map of geopolitical
interdependences. Some countries, previously heavily energy dependent, can turn into
producers in the near future. Others, with capacity of converting new resources into
power, might even become an important regional player (Kaplan 2012).
Another key development is the diffusion of LNG, which facilitates energy flows
and weakens oil linked long-term contracts (LTCs). LTCs, with its famous ‘‘take-or-
pay clause’’ have highly politicized energy relations based on the number of
preferential agreements between producer countries and consumer countries.
As Figs. 1, 2 shows, the energy markets will probably not be fully globalized by
2035 but consumer countries will have more options to choose their supplier, which
therefore will decrease dependence and weaken the possibility of using energy by its
producers as political instrument.4
According to the WEO (2012) findings the changing outlook for energy
production and use may redefine global and economic geopolitical balances. Policy-
makers will face critical choices in reconciling their objectives. For these reasons
the authors will focus on such countries as Russia, United States, China, Qatar
which are not only major energy player but also important political actors.
The Geopolitical Implication for Major Energy Actors
Russia has been a typical example of a country that gained political profits from its
energetic resources (Giordano 2009). During the last 20 years Russian preference in
Fig. 1 Share of global energy demand to 2035. Source: WEO (2012)
4 According to J. Stern (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies) LTCs in its old formula are no longer
competitive. However, it is not expected to be over. It will rather become more flexible formula without
take-or-pay clause and for shorter term (maximum 10, 8 years), Conference European Gas Challenges:
demand and pricing, 26.11.2012, Rome.
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foreign policy was empowering of state based on controlling export and transit of
energy resources to Europe (Kononczuk 2012). However, recent developments on
the global energy markets will have probably strong and negative implications for
Russia. Moscow should be concerned about the popularization of LNG and an
increased supply of cheaper gas, which is the consequence of the shale gas
revolution. Russia will struggle to sell energetic resources to Europe at high prices
and with old LTCs because of the increasing competition.5 On the other hand, there
are European potential shale gas reserves, especially in Poland and Ukraine, which
could highly decrease Central-Eastern Europe strong dependency on Russian energy
resources—an important power factor in Moscow’s geopolitical position towards
countries of this region and the EU.
Taking into account the above, Russian foreign policy preference will be
maintaining its current position at the market as long as possible. Moscow intends to
achieve it speeding gas-pipeline projects up in order to bind up countries which
would participate in investments like the South Stream (Kardas and Paszyc 2012).
Moreover, Kremlin’s diplomacy obstructs implementation of the European Union’s
Third Energy Package by using its WTO new membership status. According to
some experts, Russia may support a campaign against the shale gas in Europe. To
this end, it uses very sophisticated instruments like negative media campaigns (e.g.
Russia Today—a TV channel in English, frequently broadcasts very critical
reportages about shale gas) or funding campaigns against fracking technology
(Burgess 2012). Russia is opening to foreign investors (large contracts for the
Fig. 2 The prediction of major global gas trade flows, 2035. Source: WEO (2012)
5 According to Bellodi (Senior Vice President of Eni), progressive changes in the market indicate that a
return to the model of indexing gas prices based oil—link formula is impossible. This model could be
competitive to spot prices only if crude oil prices could fall to 70 $ per barrel. Thanks to LNG
development consumers are gaining a stronger position. The example of this is a European Commission
procedure against Gazprom. Conference: World Energy Outlook 2012 presentation, 14.12.2012, Rome.
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exploration of the Arctic signed by Rosnieft with ExxonMobil, Eni, and Statoil)
aiming at filling the technological gap in and, hence, becoming more competitive.
Paradoxically, the developments in Russia, where generally the resources of
hydrocarbon of both types: conventional and unconventional exist,6 will rather not
have any bigger impact on the maintenance of Russia’s geostrategic power. This
power has not been so far based on a position of ‘‘the most competitive producer’’,
but on the advantage of being a monopolist. Therefore, the most dangerous for
Russia are almost inevitable external developments, which might bring the Russian
monopoly on the gas market to an end. The foreign policy activities already
mentioned above will probably only allow Russia to postpone it. In order to prevent
its decline, Russia will rather pursue an expansive-defensive foreign policy both
with regards to bilateral and multilateral fields (like WTO procedures against Third
Energy Package implementation) to protect its current positions. Moscow, in view
of the loss of its current supply monopoly, might try to gain control of new routes of
energy transport (e.g. Russian Arctic aggressive policy, Blank 2011). It is rather
unlikely that Kremlin would come back to the efforts of creating gas cartel because
unconventional gas production occurs mainly in countries that are politically far
away from Russia (US, Qatar, Australia). Nonetheless, it will be difficult for Russia
to use the energy as a political instrument in a long term and Kremlin will have to
get more involved in the development of more economically profitable but less
politically influential oil sector companies (TNK-BP and Rosnieft fusion is probably
a sign of this approach).
United States have been the biggest importer of the energy resources for last
decades. Currently they import about 20 % of their general energy demand. This
fact has obviously influenced American foreign policy, where one of the main
preferences has been concentration on reinforcing its energy security. As a
consequence, a fundamental principle of American activities on international arena
was to maintain its influence in the Middle East in order to protect current
hydrocarbon supply to the US. Therefore, in past decades US deployed army forces
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; besides, it was deeply involved in conflicts with
Iraq in 1991 and 2003 (Fandy 1997).
However, the recent increase in the American production of unconventional oil
and gas has shown that the role of North America in the world energy market is
changing. According to WEO (2012) US will become the biggest world producer of
oil by 2020 and net oil exporter by 2030. This fact will have probably a serious
implications for American foreign policy preferences. When America meets the
objective of energy self sufficiency the previous preference regarding enhancing
energy security through protecting its strategic foreign suppliers will not be actual
anymore. It means that in the future Washington may lose its interests in defending
its position in the Middle East. This may evoke serious consequences for traditional
American allies such as Israel or Saudi Arabia and Jordan where Washington
supports the local monarchies. Washington may not be interested in keeping its
6 Last reports suggest that in Russia could produce between 5–20 thousands of bcm of shale gas by
2025–2030. The Ministry of Energy has even recommended preparations for the potential development of
the technology of the production from this source but Gazprom, which is a superpower in the
conventional gas, still remains skeptical.
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soldiers in these countries, or at least could not be ready ‘‘to die for the
undemocratic regimes’’ in case of protests similar to those that occurred in other
countries during the Arab Spring (Ratner and Nerurkar 2011).7
American energy self-sufficiency in addition to other new developments on
energy markets, may have also important implications for balances and interde-
pendencies in the whole region. Dynamically growing oil production in Iraq will
enhance slowly its political influence in the region (IEO 2012). The intervention in
Iraq in 2003 gave hope for possible change of the negative regional constellation
characterized by difficult relations between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. However, it
is still not known whether new government in Baghdad carries out pro-American
policy or rather appeases Teheran, what is observed recently. This could put Riyadh
and other American allies in even worse situation than before 2003 when although
Iraq and Iran were Riyadh’s enemies, they had difficult relations between each
other. Therefore traditional America’s allies might get forced to seek new partners.
On the other hand, new emerging powers like China and, India which will depend
more and more on Middle East’s resources, should be more involved in stability
issues of the region, taking over American influence.
Although it is still it is not clear whether Washington is determined enough to
directly influence the global energy market thanks to exporting its hydrocarbons
(Lugar 2012), authors believe that American foreign policy preference will maintain
its current position on the energy market. Thanks to the predominant position of the
US on the international scene and the vast choice of efficient instruments of foreign
policy, Washington does not need to use energy in order to increase its political
influence. The experience of past decades shows that Americans are even more
eager to limit production of its strategic resources in case the situation in global
energy markets deteriorates.8 That leads to conclusions that although America, due
to its technology leadership (e.g. shale gas), may present an offensive approach
supporting new developments on global energy markets (both through bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy), it will rather present a conservative strategy without
undertaking an expansive policy on foreign markets in comparison to previous
years. Thus, the recent developments on the global energy markets will have
probably positive but moderate implications for US. However, taking into account
the changing Washington’s energy interests, it will represent one of many factors
for a slow consolidation of US global involvement (Brzezin´ski 2012).
As regard to China, if anyone doubts whether it will becomes a leading regional
or global power should look up at its global energy developments implications.
China, which has not been traditionally very involved in energy diplomacy thanks to
7 Nowadays, the presence of American troops is even more crucial for Saudi Arabia. After the attacks of
the 11th of September 2001 and Riyadh’s support for American war against terrorism, the ambience of
Saudi Arabia is more hostile towards the royal family. There are not only traditional opponents like Iran,
Syria, but also new governments that have emerged after the Arab Spring, in major part with Shiites
influence.
8 Nowadays there is a discussion in the United States regarding possible use of growing production of
shale gas and oil. President Obama’s administration is skeptical about a perspective of exporting its
strategic resources focusing more on internal energy security. Politicians close to the Republicans, on the
other hand, suggest to use energy as a new offensive component of foreign policy, including cooperation
in this area with NATO countries.
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its rapid economic growth, in few years might become not only the biggest energy
world consumer, but also, with the scale of domestic market, the most important
energy trend launcher as well (Qinhua 2007).9
The changes on energy markets will have serious geopolitical implications for
China. Sharp increases in energy requirements means that development of domestic
energy production and implementing efficiency policies will be not enough for
Chinese demand. Due to the lack of domestic supply and increasing dependence on
imported energy, the highest preference in Chinese energy policy will be
enhancement of energy security. The imperative for China energy strategy will
be therefore to ‘‘pluralize’’ gas and oil sources and increase the security of energy
transportation. Counting on external supplies can make China more vulnerable for
new types of problems related to war against piracy, control of transit corridors.
That means that Beijing will be forced to conduct more expansive foreign policy
both in regard to bilateral and multilateral relations (e.g. a stronger involvement in
activity of the Regional Piracy Center in Kuala Lumpur) to provide stable supplies
from abroad.
The first step has been already made through strengthening relations with Central
Asian energy suppliers—one of China’s core areas of international energy
cooperation. This pattern was characterized by dedicating great efforts in building
gas and oil pipelines between China and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and active
participation in the gas and oil exploitation of other countries, such as Uzbekistan
(Xuetang 2006). There have been also long talks with Russia regarding building
new gas pipeline (the new oil pipeline is active since 2010) but considering the
consistent lack of trust between the two countries and a popularization of LNG, it
seems that the western direction is not going to be the only alternative for Chinese
energy policy. To ensure that its international energy interests are realized, China
must undertake steps to resolutely develop energy relationships with different actors
far beyond traditional zone of Beijing influence. In this regard, in the coming years,
Chinese will probably increase activities in Africa or in Greenland.
The recent WEO (2012) report says that the region MENA will become a crucial
for oil and gas import in the future. WEO (2012) predicts that by 2035 China will be
the biggest importer of Middle East oil. Therefore China depending on Iranian oil
could continue to back Teheran nuclear program in the short term. But in the long
term, especially if Washington’s decreases its interests as a consequence of gaining
energy dependency, Beijing will be forced to get more involved politically and take
bigger responsibility for the whole region. That could mean more balanced
approach and the necessity of strengthening relations with traditional American
partners like Saudi Arabia and Iraq.10 The possibility of a military presence of
Chinese troops in order to protect its strategic suppliers, control of transit corridors
and to fight against piracy should not be excluded.
Another important Chinese foreign policy factor emerging from the new
developments on global energy markets is a growing number of big consumers
9 1993 was the crucial year for China when it turned from an exporter of crude oil into a pure importer.
10 However, Riyadh and Beijing relationship seems difficult taking into account the Chinese support for
Teheran.
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competing for oil and gas, especially India and Japan, which will be forced to find a
replacement for nuclear power after the country has decided to gradually move
away from this source of energy consequently the Fukushima disaster. China and
India, rather than conducting strong competition, have started to cooperate in this
field, exploiting oil in Kazakhstan and jointly entering into the Sudan oil
exploitation project, thus becoming business partners. They have also begun to
work together in Iran. In the future, China and India should work hand in hand,
taking part in international energy exploration and distribution, diversifying risks
what can bring both countries closer politically. The Japanese case is far different
because of the difficult political relations conditioned by past affairs and the fact
that Tokyo has been traditionally an ally of Washington. Moreover, both countries
are in disputes over energy-rich areas such as the South China Sea (Caldwell Harris
2001). With increasing energy demand in the two countries, this dispute could
explode with a new power, leading to a serious regional crisis.
To sum up, the new trends in the global energy markets and the increasing
demand for energy will force Beijing to a stronger commitment to new regions of
the world and running almost global stabilization policies to strategic locations such
as the Middle East. Thus, China will slowly take the role of the US as a protector of
stability for some countries. At the same time Beijing is likely to be presented in a
more assertive stance of unresolved disputes in energy-rich areas.11
Qatar is the largest LNG exporter and one of the largest gas producers in the
world. Thanks to relying on LNG infrastructure12 Qatar has a greater flexibility in
where it sends its natural gas than countries bounded by pipelines. What is the most
important about this tiny country is its capacity in converting energy resources into
political power. The country, which for many years used to be perceived as a
‘‘smaller brother’’ of Saudi Arabia, thanks to energy sector modernization in 1990s
and sophisticated tools of foreign policy has undergone a remarkable transformation
to emerge as a regional key player, also with a global influence (Qatar hosts of the
Gas Exporting Country Forum). The Arab Spring showed it fully when Doha was
giving military support to the opposition of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya as
well as backing key players in another countries (Steinberg 2012). However the
biggest weapons of Qatar’s foreign policy with the global impact is the TV station
Al Jazeera—soft power tool which has revealed itself to the whole world as a
political instrument of the Qatari leadership. The success of this TV would not be
possible without the gas export profits (Hroub 2011).
The current WEO (2012) forecast seems to be rather moderate-positive for Doha.
Both the growing demand of gas and LNG export development—where Qatar has a
leading role, should only consolidate its strong position at the market. There is also
no big risk from competitors. The supply from new LNG exporting countries (e.g.
Mozambique) should be rather directed towards Asia. Therefore, Doha should
maintain its contracts, especially as it owns interests in LNG import terminals in
11 According to US National Intelligence Council: ‘‘China and India’s perceived need to secure access to
energy supplies will propel these countries to become more global rather than just regional powers, while
Europe and Russia’s co-dependency is likely to be strengthened.’’
12 Qatar has two LNG complexes—Qatargas and Ras Laffan but also one of the largest LNG tanker
fleets.
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Europe and the United States. Moreover, changes in Qatar’s environment caused by
the new energy developments do not seem to have such a serious geopolitical
impact like in the Saudi Arabia case. Even lower Washington’s interest of this
region caused by US energy independence (Qatar is currently hosting an important
US military Central Command facilities that support ongoing operations in MENA,
Iraq, and Afghanistan) should not put Doha in a serious risk. It is because Qatar’s
foreign policy is driven by a strong pragmatism and sympathy for Islamists.13 On
the one hand, the basic principles of Qatar’s foreign policy played a major role in its
policies towards countries of Arab Spring (that’s why Qatar was positioned as ally
of the West in the democratic changes in Arab Spring). On the other hand, Qatar’s
leaders provided targeted support to Islamists and Salafists. Qatar is currently ready
to speak not only with the main actor of Arab Spring—the Muslim Brotherhood but
also with al-Qaeda. It is easier for Doha to speak to extremists than for Riyadh. The
Qatari monarchy has little in common with fallen republican regimes in the Arab
world (Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists are closer to their interpretation of
Wahhabism) whereas Saudi Arabia relations with this organization deteriorated
sharply after WTC giving a strong support to US (Steinberg 2012).
Summarizing, the new energy trends do neither pose serious direct risks for
geopolitical position of Qatar nor for its environment. That means that Qatar can
continue its policy based on empowering of state thanks to a stable income from
energy resources and using its sophisticated soft power—Al Jazeera.
The comparative overview of the geopolitical implications of the new
developments on global energy markets provided (Table 1), explains how
Russia—which up to now was fairly building its geopolitical position on gas
resources—and China—characterised by negative perspectives regarding increasing
energy import dependency—will be probably negatively affected by new develop-
ments on energy markets.
Moscow and Beijing will be forced to seek new partners in non traditional zone
of their interests or undergo an expansive foreign policy on international arena to
Table 1 The comparative overview of case studies










position on the energy
market
Maintaining its current












13 Qatar hosts the Taliban and Hamas regional offices, as well as a host of international organizations—
Georgetown University, the British Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies—
creating a space where the west rubs shoulders with the Islamic world. Until 2009 Qatar even hosted an
Israeli trade centre, which has to be closed after the Israeli incursion into Gaza.
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protect their energy security or, at least, to maintain the current position on the
energy market. To this end, in order to postpone those changes, Russia will probably
adopt a defensive strategy; while China, on the other hand, will implement a more
offensive strategy, as it is interested in new technologies to meet its own energy
demand.
At the same time, it is likely that US and Qatar will take advantage of the changes
occurring on energy markets. The leading role in sectors with growing trends like
LNG and shale gas will predispose those countries to more offensive attitude
towards the new developments. However, with the experience of past decades
showing that the US are more eager to limit production of their strategic resources
in case the situation in global energy markets deteriorates, Washington will rather
not be inclined towards using energy as a political tool and will prefer to consolidate
its energy security by maintaining its leading position on the shale gas market. To
this end, US might adopt a rather conservative strategy based on decreasing its
involvement in the Middle East. Analysing the recent Qatar’s involvement in the
Arab Spring and its capacity of converting its energetic potential into political
power, we might expect this country to continue an expansive foreign policy to be
aimed at increasing its influence in the region.
Conclusions
This article attempted to analyse possible implications related to the new
developments occurring on global energy markets, taking into account main energy
actors and their foreign policy preferences and strategies. In doing this, it was
assumed that changes on the global energy markets, such as bigger competition and
flexibility of transport, will lead to their progressive liberalization, even if they will
not fairly de-politicize the energy policy that, in the end, will still be an important
factor of international relations. However, in the future, using energy directly as a
political negative tool might be more and more difficult. This means that the
winners of the global strategic resources game will be those states able to use more
sophisticated foreign policy tools and which have an open approach to new
developments (US, Qatar); while, those countries that will keep on using energy as
direct pressure (Russia) for empowering its geopolitical positions might find
themselves in troubles.
The presented evidence suggests also that changing energy outlook may redefine
global geopolitical balances and disrupt the existing patterns. Growing dependence
on Middle East oil imports will affect Asia, especially China for decades to come
and create new imperatives to strengthen relationships with suppliers. It means that
in the future Beijing, one of the biggest energy consumer, will be probably driven to
take over the American role and responsibilities. As a result, China will have to
conduct a similar foreign policy like the current American one, protecting its
strategic suppliers and being more involved in transport security. Furthermore,
Qatar might be taking Russian role as it performed greater capacity in converting
energetic resources into political power. Traditional producer countries like Russia,
on the other hand, apart from conducting foreign policy having as main goal the
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prevention of those changes, might seek new strengths for their geopolitical
positions, such as controlling transit routes.
While the findings presented in this paper account for the geopolitical
implications for four major energy actors, further research regarding political risks
is needed to confront and develop the preliminary conclusions. In doing this, it
would be especially interesting to examine and explain the water issue and new
transit routes in the wider energy context.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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